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BOOKS REVIEWED
Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy. By Harry D. Krause. Indianapolis: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1971. Pp. xx, 379. $14.00.
It may be said with some assurance that most individuals understand and
can even define illegitimacy. Despite its six syllables and the fact that it may
be the longest word in their vocabulary, people are intrigued by the sexual and
personal implications of illegitimacy. Moreover, most people would probably
sum up their understanding of illegitimacy in the phrase "birth out-of-wedlock"
-something to be avoided like smallpox. Throughout recorded history, and
even in the Old Testament,' illegitimacy has been described in opprobrious
terms. A false allegation of illegitimacy has traditionally been a basis for
recovery in tort.2 As if bastard were not a sufficiently scurrilous appellation,
early Christians referred to illegitimates as "adulterous" or "incestuous bastards." Until the past decade, at least one state law made reference to "miscegenous" bastards. 3
Although the concept of illegitimacy is easily understood and readily defined
in the mind of the average layman, and although the same layman prefers to
disassociate himself from all aspects of illegitimacy, whether as parent or
offspring, Professor Krause of the University of Illinois College of Law has had
the temerity to write an exhaustive and engaging treatise on the subject. Not
only does he prove that illegitimacy constitutes a very complex legal and social
problem, but he also convinces the reader that the illegitimate, whatever the
circumstances of his birth, has a compelling case for equal treatment and equal
protection in any court of law under any concept of social justice. This is,
indeed, an excellent treatise, based on thorough research and copious documentation. The extensive bibliography and thorough citation of authority should
enable a scholar to pursue any aspect of this challenging problem on the basis
of authorities cited by the author. Fortunately, the author has not investigated
his subject from an ivory tower, but, instead, has gained practical knowledge
and experience by arguing in behalf of the illegitimate before the United States
Supreme Court and by conducting a survey of public attitudes towards illegitimacy in the State of Illinois. The author, therefore, knows whereof he speaks,
and his social and legal theories are supported by a firm foundation of pragmatism.
This is a timely book because illegitimacy is an increasingly important social
problem in an era that stresses civil rights. How prevalent is illegitimacy? Professor Krause quotes from the latest census to show that more than one in
1. "A bastard shall not enter the congregation of the Lord; even to his tenth geneation
shall he not enter into the congregation of the Lord." Deuteronomy 23:2 (King james).
2. See W. Prosser, Torts § 111 (4th ed. 1971).
3. See H. Krause, Illegithnacy: Law and Social Policy 12-13 n.12 (1971) [hereiafter
cited as Krause].
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twelve children born in 1967 were illegitimate. In absolute figures, 318,100
illegitimate children were added in 1967, or a total of 1,187,000 in the four
years commencing in 1964. 4 In the past decade enough illegitimates were born
to populate the city of Los Angeles. More important for the future is the fact
that the rate of illegitimacy is accelerating rapidly, with the prospect that one
out of every ten births will be illegitimate in this decade, with a much higher
percentage in the ghetto. 5 From the point of view of social welfare these statistics contain some foreboding implications, inasmuch as the rate of illegitimacy
has already reached forty per cent in many urban areas.6
From the standpoint of humane and compassionate social justice, the argument in favor of equal rights and equal protection for the illegitimate is succinct, yet compelling: Because the illegitimate child has no control over his
birth status, such status should not have adverse effects on his rights and opportunities as a citizen. To paraphrase this argument, we could say that a
child who is born out of wedlock is not an illegitimate child of legitimate
parents, but rather the legitimate child of an illegitimate marriage. Irrespective
of the manner in which this argument is formulated, it should be obvious that
the sins of the parents should not be visited on their offspring. A fortiori, when
the status of illegitimacy is not due to a meretricious relationship between the
parents but, instead, is due to some innocent defect in the marriage procedure
of the parents, or to a non-criminal act of sexual intercourse which is never
consecrated by marriage vows, why should the innocent offspring of such a
relationship be labeled a bastard, with all the stigma that is still attached to
that term? The answer to this question is rooted deeply in long-standing social
prejudice and legal discrimination. Combined with this prejudice and discrimination is a lack of sensitivity on the part of the legitimate members of the
general public to the sense of degradation endured by the illegitimate. An
illustration of this insensitivity is found in the title of the action to ascertain
paternity, which is still called a "bastardy action" by lawyer and layman, and
which is still brought primarily for the benefit of the public to punish the
offending father7 and to lower the cost of public welfare.8 In the absence of a
paternity statute, even the state cannot impose a duty of support on the father
when his identity is ascertained, since at common law an illegitimate is filius
nullius (no one's son); and only a few paternity statutes permit the court to
confer legitimate status on the child 9 or award inheritance rights in addition to
support. 10 Thus, to the illegitimate himself the fact of illegitimacy is of paramount importance when he seeks his place in society, whereas to society the
hopes and fears and even the constitutional rights of the illegitimate are of
4. Bureau of Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States:
1969, at 48, 50 (1969).
5. U.S. News & World Report, Oct. 2, 1967, at 85.
6. N.Y. Times, July 1, 1968, at 21, col. 1.
7. E.g., F. v. M., 96 N.J. Super. 335, 233 A.2d 65 (App. Div. 1967).
8. E.g., People ex rel. Elkin v. Rimicci, 97 Ill. App. 2d 470, 240 N.E.2d 195 (1968).
9. E.g., Alas. Stat. § 25.20.050 (1965).
10. E.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-234 (Supp. 1970); Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 237.06 (Supp. 1971).
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slight concern and are all too frequently ignored. When courts weigh the respective interests of the illegitimate and of his father and mother against those of
the taxpaying public, the scales tip heavily against the so-called bastard. All the
opprobrium for the out-of-wedlock birth is heaped on the by-product of the
out-of-wedlock liaison. The author offers no immediate panacea for this miscarriage of justice, nor does he see Utopia on the horizon. Instead, he predicts
a long up-hill battle which must be fought on many fronts. Professor Krause
discusses the problem from every point of view, even examining in detail the
laws of Norway, France and West Germany, and reaches the conclusion, in
which the reader is persuaded to concur, that the illegitimate has a strong case
in both law and equity and on the facts, needing only his day in court before an
unbiased judge and a tolerant, sympathetic, and open-minded jury in order to
vindicate his rights.
In the opening statement of his preface, the author states that his book
"investigates and states the current law of illegitimacy."'" True to his word,
Professor Krause portrays all applicable law, past and present. For the most
part, it is a dismal picture that he paints. To a layman, this discussion may seem
esoteric and difficult to follow. Indeed, the first three chapters appear to constitute a legal dissertation written by a lawyer for other lawyers, and may well
discourage a layman from reading further. These chapters are comprehensible
and articulate, however, and they must be read and thoroughly understood if
the reader is to understand the over-all problem and the possible solutions that
are suggested by the author in the form of a "Uniform Legitimacy Act." This
reviewer is confident that a layman will feel well rewarded for his effort. With
these opening chapters properly digested, the reader, whether layman, doctor,
lawyer or Indian Chief, cannot fail to be intrigued by the remaining chapters
which consider the methods of ascertaining paternity, the public attitudes on
law and illegitimacy, based on a competent survey, and foreign approaches to
illegitimacy. Perhaps the most interesting chapter of all is Chapter 8, where,
after discussing a proposed Uniform Legitimacy Act, the author reviews the
public issues relating to illegitimacy. Here he presents the sociological aspects
of illegitimacy. From this discussion, it becomes all too apparent that illegitimacy is an important arena in the war against poverty. If taxpayers are intent
on reducing public welfare costs and solving the problems of the ghetto, they
must realize that the status of the illegitimate in our urban society must be
improved. Professor Krause informs us that the "'culture of poverty'" may be
as much a function of illegitimacy as illegitimacy is a function of the "'culture
of poverty.' "12
The author makes it clear, after examining the law and mores of the United
States, Norway, France, West Germany and other Scandinavian and eastern
European countries, that the solutions to the problems of the illegitimate will
not come easily. This in itself is a refreshing point of view, when expressed by
an expert in the field, because too often today current periodicals offer simple
solutions to the problem of illegitimacy: contraceptives for teenagers, more
11.
12.

Krause vii.
Id. at 237.
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parental control, sex education in schools, stricter moral codes, and even compulsory sterilization. These articles uniformly fail to inform the reader of the
true dimensions of the problem, its real causes, and the avenues that are open
for extricating the illegitimate from his degraded status. Alas, we learn from the
expert that daughters of respectable middle-class parents may deliberately
invite illegitimacy, that illegitimacy may be caused by misdirected welfare
regulations, and that among black minority groups illegitimacy is not necessarily a social stigma.13 In fact, adolescent Negro girls may invite pregnancy to
prove they are adults. 4 At the very least, Professor Krause has given us the
nature of the beast, and is commendably frank in admitting that there is no
easy way to subjugate him.
To improve the status of the illegitimate, the laws affecting the illegitimate
must be changed. In proposing changes in the law, Professor Krause emphasizes
changes in the realm of "private law." More specifically, he would focus attention on changes in the relationship between the illegitimate child and its father.
Before such a change in the law can actually benefit the child, the identity of
its father must first be ascertained and his financial ability to furnish support
must be demonstrated. Once the identity of the father is ascertained (and this
is becoming more feasible with the help of modern science), the father-child
relationship need not begin and end with the right to support. The concomitants
of the right to support include the right of inheritance, the right to have the
father's name on his birth certificate, the right to sue under wrongful death
statutes, the right to receive benefits under workmen's compensation acts and
various state and federal welfare laws, and the right to the same citizenship as
the father. Not to be overlooked are the corresponding rights of the father to
custody, visitation, guardianship, consent to adoption, and various financial
benefits that may be derived from the father's relationship to his child.
To eliminate the social stigma of illegitimacy, as well as the financial deprivations, social attitudes must also be changed. This change can be accelerated by
enlightened legislation. By the same token, more compassionate social attitudes
can produce more enlightened legislation. It is interesting and encouraging to
note from the Opinion Survey, described in Chapter 5 and Appendix B, that
social attitudes toward illegitimacy today appear to be more humane and compassionate than the law itself. On the basis of this survey conducted in Illinois,
seventy-eight per cent of those interviewed would give the illegitimate equality
in terms of support rights, while ninety-five per cent would provide support for
the child beyond the father's death. Sixty-four per cent would give the illegitimate equality in terms of inheritance rights. Only twenty per cent believed that
the laws which discriminate against the illegitimate are effective to discourage
promiscuity, although this has always been one of the justifications for discriminating against illegitimates. Finally, an impressive ninety-six per cent felt
that the law should not disadvantage a child by reason of its illegitimate birth.15
13. See id. at 260-62.
14. Gans, The Negro Family: Reflections on the Moynihan Report, Commonweal, Oct.
15, 1965, at 47.
15. Krause 173-74.
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Quite a contrast to the filius nullius concept of the common lawl Quite a contrast to the prevailing bastardy acts which impose only a limited support obligation on the father if and when he is ever ascertainedl A natural ecplanation
for the lag between public opinion and legislative action is found in the absence
from legislative corridors of any effective spokesman for the illegitimate. The
lack of a lobby for the illegitimate is hardly a valid excuse for the lack of legislation in this area, however, and is surely not a reason for maintaining the status
quo. It is noteworthy that England, in the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act of 1970, has begun to accord some recognition to the rights of illegitimate children.' 6
The legal basis for equal rights for the illegitimate is the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. This
clause was applied by the Supreme Court in Levy v. Louisiana17 and Glona v.
American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.'8 to invalidate the Louisiana
Wrongful Death Art. In applying the equal protection clause to this state statute which discriminated on the basis of illegitimacy, the Court found this criterion to be an invidious classification and, therefore, unconstitutional. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court in Levy stressed "the intimate, familial relationship between a child and his own mother."1 9 In terms of "equal protec"tion," the Court could find no justification for absolving a tortfeasor from
liability under the Louisiana Wrongful Death Act merely because the child who
claimed damages for the loss of his mother was illegitimate, when a legitimate
child would admittedly have been entitled to recover. In allowing the illegitimate children to recover for their mother's wrongful death, the Court concluded: "[I]t is invidious to discriminate against them when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the
mother." 20 Justice Harlan filed a forceful dissent which might, at first, seem to
dispose of the majority's arguments. However, Professor Krause clearly points
out the weaknesses in the dissent and affirms the illegitimate's right to recover
by emphasizing that "the illegitimate child is disadvantaged purely by reason
of his birth status .... ,21
It would seem to follow from the preceding discussion of Levy and Glona
that the Supreme Court in one fell swoop has vindicated the rights of the
illegitimate and abolished the invidious distinction between legitimates and
illegitimates by according "equal protection" to the latter. Compelling as this
conclusion may seem in terms of logic, common sense and fair play, such was
not the case. While Levy and Glona settled the question of the illegitimate's
rights concerning his mother, the illegitimate's claim to "equal protection" in
his relationship with his father is far from settled. Granted that paternity is
more difficult to prove in most cases than maternity, it is, nevertheless, merely
16. Rowland, Matrimonial Law in England Today, 57 A.B.JAJ. 981, 984 (1971).
17.

391 U.S. 68 (1968).

18.

391 U.S. 73 (1968).

19.

391 U.S. at 71 (footnote omitted).

20.

Id. at 72.

21.

Krause 67.
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a question of proof, and once paternity has been established, the results in Levy
and Glona should apply to the father as well as the mother.
Notwithstanding the decisions in Levy and Glona, the Supreme Court in
Labine v. Vincent,2 2 decided in 1971, split 5-4 in upholding a Louisiana statute
which denied an illegitimate child the right to inherit from his father. While
Labine does not necessarily deny an illegitimate the right to have the identity of
his father ascertained and subsequently to obtain support from his father, it
does constitute a setback for the proponents of "equal protection" for the
illegitimate. Granted that the battle for equal rights for the illegitimate cannot
be won entirely in the judicial arena, just as the courts have been unable to
eliminate segregation in our educational system by judicial fiat, nevertheless,
the courts are an indispensable ally of the illegitimate in his uphill battle for
equal treatment in our society.23 The parallel situations are ironic in that the
blacks are struggling for desegregation in our public schools and are also the
most affected by the stigma of illegitimacy due to the higher rate of illegitimacy
in the black segment of our society.2 4
An examination of the law of the Scandinavian countries and West Germany
illustrates how enlightened legislation can remedy the plight of the illegitimate.
As early as 1915 Norwegian law began to eliminate distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children, and by 1956 all such distinctions had virtually
been eliminated by statute.2 5 The Norwegian law is said to be a model of
simplicity and common sense. West Germany has gone so far as to include an
article in its Constitution of 1949 to insure that "[i]llegitimate children shall,
through legislation, be given the same conditions for their physical and spiritual
development and their position in society as legitimate children. "2-0 While this
provision may not be free of ambiguities, the national purpose is clear. At the
very least it has transformed what was, in effect, a presumption of unequal
treatment of the illegitimate into a presumption of equal treatment. Surely such
a constitutional provision will have a healthy effect on social attitudes. Of equal
to provide
significance is the willingness of foreign governments, e.g., Norway,
27
social welfare support for illegitimate children and their mothers.
A critical step in the enforcement of the legal rights of an illegitimate, even
in the most enlightened of societies, is the proof of paternity. If paternity
cannot be established, a myriad of rights and perquisites of a father-child
relationship cannot be realized.28 In the chapter on the ascertainment of
22.
23.

401 U.S. 532 (1971).
For a discussion of the illegitimate's rights under the due process clause of the four-

teenth amendment, see Petrillo, Labine v. Vincent: Illegitimates, Inheritance, and the Four.
teenth Amendment, 75 Dick. L. Rev. 377 (1971).

24. U.S. News and World Report, Mar. 30, 1970, at 30; N.Y. Times, Jul. 1, 1968, at 21,
col 1.
25. Krause 179.

26. Grundgesetz art. VI(5) (W. Ger.).
27. Krause 183.
28. In France, where there are severe limitations on the circumstances under which a
paternity action may be brought, there were approximately 50,000 illegitimate births in 1962,
yet only 500 paternity actions were filed. Of these, 316 proved successful whereas 184 failed.
Id. at 197.
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paternity, 29 Professor Krause discusses the types of scientific evidence that are
available to courts in a paternity action, as well as the various legal theories and
doctrines that may be applied in a paternity action. Blood typing, periods of
gestation, and anthropology are not subjects usually covered in legal education,
and seldom does a lawyer have occasion to plumb the depths of such esoteric
subjects; yet Professor Krause presents an illuminating account of the possibilities of proving paternity by the use of blood tests, anthropological evidence,
and determination of periods of gestation. Today paternity can not only be
disproved positively by blood tests, but it may also be affirmatively proved
with a very small margin of error. Not only do improved methods of scientific
proof of paternity improve the chances of establishing paternity, but also, by
making the outcome of a paternity action more certain and predictable, the
sordid details and degrading atmosphere of the typical bastardy trial can be
eliminated for many illegitimates and their mothers simply because the alleged
father will see the handwriting on the wall and, therefore, admit his paternity
before trial Improved methods of scientific proof also serve the salutary purpose of absolving innocent men of false charges of paternity in a courtroom
atmosphere where, all other things being equal, the judge tends to sympathize
with the accusing mother. Professor Krause reports a survey conducted in New
York City30 in 1959 estimating that one man in seven, or a total of 645 men,
was erroneously held liable as the "father" of someone else's child. Part of the
reason why men falsely admit paternity, or are erroneously held liable, may be
that
[C]urrent paternity prosecution practice in many metropolitan areas is abhorrent.
Blackmail and perjury flourish, accusation is often tantamount to conviction, decades
of support obligation are decided upon in minutes of court time and indigent 3 defendants usually go without counsel or a clear understanding of what is involved. '
Small wonder that the putative father looks upon his illegitimate child as an
adversary, whether or not the child is his biological offspring. And small wonder
that illegitimates and their mothers often forego the sordid ordeal of a paternity
action in order to preserve some self-respect. The most tragic aspect of the
whole situation is that the illegitimate has the most to lose in the long run under
such a system, although he is free of both legal and moral responsibility for his
illegitimate status.
Plainly, the courts should be less reluctant to use blood typing evidence,
even though this evidence cannot definitely exclude a putative father as the
biological father. The Uniform Act on Blood Tests would permit the court to
consider such evidence with proper safeguards to minimize the chance of error.32
Professor Krause carefully defines these safeguards and persuasively argues
that all relevant and reliable evidence should be available to the court when
such a vital matter as paternity, with all its legal and sociological implications,
is at issue. The most important problem area in any system of law dealing with
29. Id. at 105-60.
30. Id. at 107-08.
31. Id. at 108.
32. Id. at 129.
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the illegitimate is the procedure for ascertaining paternity. Clearly then every
scrap of competent and relevant evidence should be available to the court when
it is called upon to resolve this problem.
If the point has not already been made, it should be eminently clear from
reading Chapter 8 and Appendix D (Five Cases on Illegitimacy and Neglect
and Dependency) that Professor Krause is dealing with a very complex problem. To illustrate the complexity of the problem, we need only consider the
treatment accorded the illegitimate under the Social Security Act. No one will
dispute that the purpose of the Act, and especially the AFDC (Aid for Dependent Children) portion of the Act, is to render care and financial assistance
to those in need. Yet the federal government's attitude toward the illegitimate
under the AFDC program can only be described as ambiguous, if not actually
discriminatory. Reacting to public opinion, the federal government has frowned
upon the immorality supposedly associated with illegitimacy while it has at the
same time recognized the urgent need for welfare assistance to families with
illegitimate children. Using questionable statistics to camouflage its true activities, the federal government manages to provide some assistance to some
families with illegitimates, although this aid is probably not proportionate to
the actual needs of these families. Attempts to withhold welfare payments as
a method of controlling the morality and conduct of mothers of illegitimate
children have been rigidly circumscribed by the courts inasmuch as the child
should hardly be punished for the immoral conduct of its mother.03 Unfortunately, such attempts continue and are too often successful. Surely no one
doubts that a proper purpose of welfare legislation is to foster a home environment that is conducive to the proper social and personal development of a child.
If this can be accomplished by requiring a mother to lead an exemplary life
at the risk of losing her AFDC payments, all well and good. If the home is
already below standard, however, the situation will only be exacerbated by
withholding welfare payments, and the children in the home, who are frequently
illegitimate, will be the ultimate losers. Thus the illegitimate has the alternative
of an ameliorating home environment without AFDC aid or a deteriorating
home environment with AFDC aid-a Hobson's choice for an underprivileged
child, assuming that he has any choice at all, and a very complex problem for
all concerned!

Other controversial eligibility tests enforced under welfare programs are the
so-called "man in the house" rule and the "substitute father" rule, both of
which require welfare recipients to sacrifice one benefit in order to obtain
another. The welfare department can hardly be criticized for trying to save
money for the taxpayers and to improve the living conditions of welfare recipients, but again it is the illegitimate child who becomes the victim of circumstances beyond his control. Either his father must leave the home or his family
will be denied welfare assistance. If his father attempts to form a family unit
without the benefit of matrimony, the family will again be denied welfare
assistance. Thus the illegitimate may be confronted with dilemmas for which
33. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968).
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he is not responsible and from which he cannot extricate himself, thereby
affording him the worst of both possible worlds.
The racial discrimination that surrounds our present treatment of illegitimates is graphically demonstrated by Professor Krause in his brief as amicus
curiae in Levy v. Louisiana.3 4 He points out that seventy per cent of the white
illegitimate children are adopted and thereafter treated as legitimate children
of their adopting parents, whereas only four per cent of illegitimate black
children are adopted. In a state such as Louisiana with 1,158 white illegitimates
and 8,276 black illegitimates, only 347 white children would remain unadopted
while 7,945 blacks would remain unadopted. This means that 95.87o of all
persons potentially affected by a Wrongful Death Act which discriminates
against illegitimates are black. 35 Statistics such as these give us the true dimensions of the discrimination suffered by our black population, and emphasize the
fact that an occasional court decision invalidating a single discriminatory statute cannot provide the equal protection that minority groups in our society
deserve. If equal protection is to become a reality, these minority groups must
be afforded an opportunity to improve their status without having to overcome
the state-imposed obstacles to self-improvement that now clutter their path.
The tragedy of illegitimacy is compounded when we consider the compassion
and assistance that our society pours out in favor of the mentally handicapped
and the physically handicapped, so conspicuously lacking in the case of the
environmentally handicapped, as the illegitimate are euphemistically called.
Professor Krause quotes the Kerner Commission Report to show that many
black children become delinquent because of the lack of a family structure,
which might otherwise insulate these children against a life of crime 30 More
precisely, it is the absence of a father in the black ghetto home that deprives the
child of the necessary parental control which a working mother cannot adequately provide alone. Granted that the family has not uniformly proved to be
the bulwark of our modem society, we still have not been able to find an adequate substitute for the family to provide the nature and environment necessary
for the proper upbringing of children. If this is the sad predicament in which
so many legitimate ghetto children find themselves, a fortiori, it is the inevitable
and unpreventable plight of even more illegitimate ghetto children. It must be
admitted that paternity could not be established in many of these cases and,
even though established, the father could not provide support. This does not
mean, however, that society should not make every effort to assure illegitimates
of the right to have their fathers identified and, once identified, compelled to
provide the support, nurture, companionship and even love that would be possible in at least a few cases. Poverty does not have a corner on illegitimacy, and
parental neglect is not restricted to illegitimate children, but illegitimacy is
frequently a companion of poverty, and poverty an important factor in parental
34. Brief for N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. and National Office
for the Rights of Indigents as Amicus -Curiae, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
35. Id. at 20, quoted in Krause 259-60.
36. National Advisory Commi-ion on Civil Disorders, Report 129-30 (1968), quoted in
Krause 261-62.
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neglect. Illegitimacy is widespread and plays no favorites among our societal
classes. It simply becomes more evident and distasteful in the light of our social
welfare laws.
Here then is a timely, noteworthy and admirable piece of scholarship. It is
obviously not to be read like Ellery Queen but, with its legible type, adequate
index, thorough bibliography and table of cases, it is a book to be studied by
laymen and by members of every profession. It will not be easy reading, but it
will be rewarding reading. If judges and legislators will only practice what the
author preaches, Professor Krause will not have labored in vain-and all
illegitimates will be eternally grateful.
FRANcis C. CADY*

Democracy and Revolution. By George Novack. New York: Pathfinder Press,
Inc. 1971. Pp. 286. $7.95.
Felix Frankfurter wrote that, "[c] alled upon late in life to teach constitutional
law, a great teacher of property law [John Chipman Gray], after a brief trial,
gave it up in despair on the ground that constitutional law 'was not law at all,
but politics.' "' For a former teacher of property law who now teaches constitutional law to undertake to review a political tract, in this instance, George Novack's Democracy and Revolution, has proved to be something of the same task.
The publisher calls this book "the first comprehensive history from the Marxist
standpoint of democracy in all its important aspects."'2 The content supports that
statement. In his preface 3 and on the last page of his text,4 the author asserts
that greater democracy 5 will come from the socialist triumph, the "third American revolution" which "offers the only way to save mankind from nuclear
incineration." 6 Even if one accepts the Marxist definition of "democracy," these
theses are not proved.
The author begins by tracing the evolution of democracy from "Success in
Greece" to "Failure in the U.S." 7 Of critical importance to the author's thesis
that a true socialist state will arise phoenix-like from the ashes of American
capitalism is his rationalization for the failure of Russia and China to fit the
model of a Marxist society. The explanation offered is that the insuppressible
*

Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.

1.

Frankfurter, The Constitutional Opinions of Justice Holmes, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 683

(1916).
2. G. Novack, Democracy and Revolution (1970) (front flap) [hereinafter cited as
Novack].
3. Id. at 13-14.
4. Id. at 276.
5. It should be remembered that "[dlemocracy is a slippery term." E. Rostow, The
Democratic Character of Judidal Review, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 199 (1952).
6. Novack 276.
7. Id. at 17-205.
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bureaucratic system prevented the development of Marxism. This explanation
is clearly unsatisfactory since it contradicts Marx's theory of "historical materialism." 8 Furthermore, the mere suggestion that "bossism" may afflict a
socialist society leaves the way open to consideration of the effect of other personality problems. It also raises the question: If that can occur in Russia and
China, why not elsewhere?
In attempting to explain the "Russian" failure the author states:
Trotsky explained that the political structure of the first post-capitalist society had
undergone a pathological degeneration as a result of a specific configuration of
historical circumstances outside and inside the Soviet Union which disoriented the
Bolshevik party, derailed the revolution and transferred sovereign power from the
workers and peasants to a privileged bureaucratic caste. 9
It is submitted that this statement is not an explanation, either. It may be congruent with theories of historical materialism, but it does not aid an understanding of particular causes; hence, one is not able to evaluate the explanation.
Moreover, the above sentence is an example of what Professor Hans Furth has
criticized as "well-formed, familiar-sounding sentences" which result from using
"language without thinking."'10
Democracy and Revolution employs standard Marxist terminology, e.g.,
"masses," 'qumpenproletariat," "enemies of the people," but there are also novel
labels. The author asserts that Jefferson and Lincoln (the latter associated with
the Civil War, the "second American revolution") "stand together [with Marxists] in recognizing the organic link between democracy and revolution."" Apparently, this statement is supposed to lead to the conclusion that, just as Jefferson and Lincoln were revolutionary democrats in their respective times, so are
this century's Marxists.
The author's argument for the evolution of the American socialist state is
based upon two apparently self-evident principles: "It is a law of civilization
that political predominance inevitably falls into the hands of that class or combination of classes that commands the processes of production." 12 And: "Every
capitalist ruling class has been highly sensitive to the dynamic of democracy:
that the masses keep striving to bring the whole of society into consonance with
the professed principles of equality."' 13 But anybody can play at that game-and
cite authority, to boot. For example, Will and Ariel Durant, who are cited in the
book's discussion of Athenian Democracy, wrote that "[u] topias of equality are
biologically doomed; " 4 that "every economic system must sooner or later rely
8. "[Hlistory is determined-and the victory will, therefore, be won by the rising class
" I. Berlin, Karl Marx: His Life and
Environment 153-54 (3d ed. 1963).
9. Novack 232.
10. H. Furth, Piaget For Teachers 61 (1970).
11. Novack 189.
12. Id. at 191.
13. Id. at 204.
14. W. & A. Durant, The Lessons of 1istory 20 (1968).
whether any given individual wills it or not ....
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upon some form of the profit motive to stir individuals; "'15 and that "if the
Hegelian formula of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis is applied to the Industrial
Revolution as thesis, and to capitalism versus socialism as antithesis, the third
condition would be a synthesis of capitalism and socialism; and to this reconciliation the Western world visibly moves."' 6
Supporting references are at times "iffy": The second self-evident principle
quoted in the preceding paragraph is followed by a reference to Parkinson's reasoning that if the poor exercise their political power, they will confiscate the
property of others.' 7 Just a few paragraphs later, to support the assertion that
the "logic of democracy," i.e., the inevitable march to Marxism, is not merely
Marxist dogma, resort is had to Mr. Justice Douglas' Points of Rebellion: "'11,
with its [the Establishment] stockpile of arms, it resolves to suppress the dissenters, America will face, I fear, an awful ordeal.' '118 But that quotation follows
Douglas' statement that there could be political regeneration. "If" is not inevitable.
Chapters 12 and 15 are those most important to the author's purpose. The
first asks and seeks to answer the question "How Can Democracy Be Defended
and Extended?"' 9 The second offers "Democratic Prospects for a Socialist
America."120 The defense must be made against growing capitalist reaction, and
the "best defense of democracy is the most powerful mass offensive for workers'
power and socialism." 2 ' This will require independent political organization,
mass public protests, and "fight, arms in hand if need be ....,,2These results
will be accomplished by "the working class, which comprises the overwhelming
bulk of the population,"21 8 including white workers, blacks, radical youth, women
rebels, and dissident intellectuals and professionals.
How well do these assertions and predictions stand up against the experiences
and observations of others? One who might fit the definition of a radical youth
is Steven Kelman, author of Push Comes to Shove,2 4 a report on the Harvard
student strike of 1969. His "Introduction" makes plain that the experience taught
him, a socialist, that confrontation will not build a better America.
Another observer, historian Michael Wallace, points out that a large proportion
of the population has been materially successful and concludes: "Because the
majority of the people (and 'majority' includes elites as well as masses) has
benefited from the economic structure of the nation, they have been conserva15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 54.
Id. at 66.
Novack 204.

Id. at 205 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted), quoting W. Douglas, Points of Rebellion 97 (1970).
19. Id. at 206-20.

20. Id. at 264-76.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 217.
Id.
Id. at 209.
S. Kelman, Push Comes to Shove 5 (1970). That other less radical youth may not

practice as professionals what they preach as students, see Garrett &Pennington, Will They
Enter Private Practice?, 57 A.B.A.J. 663, 666 (1971).
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tive, determined to hold what they have.1 25 Furthermore, a look to the future
by still another student of the American scene suggests that industrialism, with
which both capitalism and socialism are so deeply concerned, is yielding to
cybernation-with a consequent decrease in work and increase in leisure. Harvey
Wheeler writes that leisure would be "virtually subversive in the socialist
26
world.,,
Other commentators and prophets, beginning with the same evidence, reach
different and conflicting conclusions. Charles A. Reich predicts a non-violent
and radical change in the way society treats its members in the Consciousness
Ill community.2 7 On the other hand, Peter F. Drucker predicts that the young
in the decade of the seventies will be traditional, if not old-fashioned.8
Finally, all of this guess-work may fall before the inexorable logic of nature.
Richard Hermstein's article "I.Q.12 suggests that differences in mental abilities
are inherited, so growing social complexity will magnify "class" differences. If
one combines the idea of inherent genetic inferiority with the theory that man's
evolution is toward a thinking organism rather than a feeling organism, the
Marxist theory of history is not very persuasive. One must conclude that there
is not much contemporary evidence to support the authors prospects for a
Socialist America.
It is important to return to a matter alluded to in the opening of this
review-a matter which, sub silentio, runs throughout the book. This sentence
appears in the last of the references to the Constitution: "Americans retain the
constitutional right to urge revolutionary change in the United States today."30
Whether use of the verb "urge" reflects a careful reading of the Supreme Court's
opinions is open to question. However, it is clear that the principle which is
stated at the beginning of Chapter 15 has no constitutional support: "The right
of revolution is 31the supreme right of any people and the ultimate safeguard of
its democracy.1
That statement contains some of the flavor of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's
language in Marbury v. Madison:32 "That the people have an original right to
establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall
most conduce to their own
happiness is the basis on which the whole American
33
fabric has been erected.
25.

M. Wallace, The Uses of Violence in American History, 40 The Am. Scholar 81, 99

(1971).

26. H. Wheeler, Democracy in a Revolutionary Era 157 (1968). Mr. Wheeler continued:
"The political and economic philosophy on which all socialist plans rest are based upon
assumptions about labour and about the industrial system.... Yet contemporary automation promises that just the opposite will occur." Id.
27. C. Reich, The Greening of America (1970).
28. P. Drucker, The Surprising Seventies, Harper's, July, 1971, at 35.
29. R. Hermstein, LQ., Atlantic, Sept., 1971, at 43.
30. Novack 266.
31. Id. at 265.
32. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
33. Id. at 175-76.
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But the existing constitutional stricture is plain: "Whatever theoretical merit
there may be to the argument that there is a 'right' to rebellion against dictatorial
governments is without force where the existing structure of the government pro34
vides for peaceful and orderly change."
GARDNER CROMWELL*

Commercial Transactions: Cases, Text and Problems on Contracts Dealing
with Personalty, Realty and Services. By Ellen A. Peters. New York:
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1971. Pp. lix, 1510. $17.50.
Teaching commercial transactions in the past few years has been like trying

to catch an increasingly accelerating snowball rolling downhill. Apparently the
awe produced by the newness of the Uniform Commercial Code has had time to
wear off, and this, in combination with the fact that the Code has now been enacted in forty-nine states,' has resulted in a proliferation of Code litigation making it a rare advance sheet that does not contain at least one case concerning the
Code. Then, too, the explosion in products liability law with the development of
the theory of strict liability in tort as a parallel to the Code, 2 and the more than
partial demise of the doctrine of privity, at least in its most rigorous applications,
have broken down old ways of thinking and generated new ones, thereby expanding the scope of commercial law courses. 3 Rapid innovations in business have
also had their impact. Checks have not substantially declined in importance,
but the puzzling problems surrounding the use and misuse of credit cards need
to be solved. 4 Finally, the consumer viewpoint has caused increasing limitations
34. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951). "Violence has no constitutional
sanction; and every government from the beginning has moved against it." W. Douglas,
Points of Rebellion 88 (1970).
* Professor of Law, University of Montana School of Law.
1. To date Louisiana is the only state which has not adopted the Uniform Commercial
Code. It has also been enacted for the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands. See
3 ULA Uniform Commercial Code, Table 1, at 5 (Supp. 1971) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].
2. See, e.g., Miller, The Crossroads: The Case for the Code in Products Liability, 21
Okla. L. Rev. 411 (1968).
3. E.g., the potential of "warranty liability" is no longer substantially confined to sales
of goods. It exists in sales of real estate (e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70,
207 A.2d 314 (1965)); leases of goods (e.g., Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark.
943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434,
212 A.2d 769 (1965)); and "service" transactions (e.g., Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 53
N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969); Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (App.
Div. 1968)). But the considerations are not always the same. Nor is the potential of "warranty liability" any longer substantially confined to the buyer and his seller. E.g., Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 NYV.2d 129 (1965), which raises additional
considerations.
4. For a brief but perceptive survey, see Webster, Bank Charge Cards-Recent Developments in Regulation and Operation, 26 Bus. Law. 43 (1970).
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on such well established rules as the holder in due course doctrine5 and the right
of a secured party to repossess collateral upon default.0 All this, and more,
has produced a crush of new material and a flux of doctrine that have decreed
a substantial change of content and emphasis in the teaching materials for commercial transactions. 7 Therefore, it is not surprising that there has been a recent
proliferation of casebooks on commercial law. Professor Peters' book is by no
means the first in this burgeoning series. Why then another?
The importance of the book lies in the fact that it reflects a different point of
view. Although it contains many cases and notes discussing the uniform statutes
and the transfers of personal property which they govern, it also includes cases
and materials dealing with service and construction contracts and with real
property transfers, to which the uniform commercial statutes do not apply.8
Professor Peters has deliberately painted a broad picture of the law of commercial transactions9 so that basic policy choices, not woven into the Code structure,
can be recognized, and the whole better evaluated. 10
5. E.g., Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 40S (1967); Uniform Consumer Credit
Code § 2.403. See also Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 2.404. The Uniform Consumer
Credit Code has been enacted in six states: Colo., Idaho, Ind., Okla-, Utah, and Wyo.
CCH Consumer Credit Guide 9l 4770 (1971).
6. E.g., Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Uniform
Consumer Credit Code § 5.103. But see, e.g., Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127
(E.D. Pa. 1971).
7. To illustrate, the first edition (1965) of the book I presently use in teaching commercial transactions (E. Farnsworth & J. Honnold, Cases and Materials on Commercial Law
(1965)), contained approximately eight principal cases decided with reference to the Uniform
Commercial Code, and some 140 principal cases controlled by law other than the Code.
There were eleven pages on warranty liability in transactions other than sale transactions,
and eighteen pages dealing with inroads on the privity doctrine. There was nothing on
credit cards, but there was an excellent treatment of consumer credit problems. The second
edition (1968) includes some sixty principal cases decided under the Code and approximately
one hundred and ten non-Code principal cases, with a relegation of many pre-Code
problems, such as personal property security, to a textual treatment, the material on
products liability law other than that fully controlled by the Code has been expanded to
sixty-nine pages; there are twenty-nine pages on credit cards; and the area of consumer credit
problems has been updated and expanded.
8. For a discussion of the application of the U.C.C. to non-sale transactions by analogy
see Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
39 Fordham L. Rev. 447 (1971).
9. "Commercial transactions" is defined by Professor Peters as "recurrent, nondonative, non-familial relationships which can be denominated mercantile or commercial
contracts." E. Peters, Commercial Transactions: Cases, Text and Problems on Contracts
Dealing with Personalty, Realty and Services v (1971) [hereinafter cited as Peters]. Compare Black's Law Dictionary 338 (4th ed. 1951) where "commercial law" is defined as
"[a] phrase used to designate the whole body of substantive jurisprudence applicable to
the rights, intercourse, and relations of persons engaged in commerce, trade, or mercantile
pursuits." But see Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. Colo. L. Rev. 461 (1967):
"But, in the vocabulary of any lawyer, as in the curriculum of any law school, 'commercial
law' stops well this side of Blackacre." Id.
10. Peters v, vi.
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These goals are consistently pursued and achieved throughout the book's
eight chapters. In the first chapter, Remedies: The Stakes, Professor Peters, in
addition to cases, presents a detailed but succinct history of what she views as
the declining ability of the seller of goods to recover the price. She then briefly
treats the ability of a seller of real property and of services to recover the price.
Although the material is heavily textual, it is designed so that class discussion
can explore the less than obvious reasons which explain why the differences in
treatment among the three types of transactions exist, why there has been a
decline in the recourse of a seller of goods to obtain the price, and whether the
picture is or should be changing as some of the old reasons for the rules fade into
obscurity. In short, the text is designed not only to round out the cases and to
economically convey information, but to be thought provoking as well. It takes
considerable skill to write, or construct, a text in this manner and Professor Peters
is to be congratulated for her fine work.
Chapter 2, The Responsibilities of the Vendor for Performance, is probably
without peer in its selection of materials and potential for teaching effectiveness.
What could better facilitate understanding of the ferment and change in products
liability law than to begin with the real property cases, specifically Levy v. C.
Young Construction Co.," which embodies the traditional view that the acceptance of a deed by the purchaser from the vendor terminates the contractual
relationship between the parties and that, absent any covenant binding the vendor
to sell a well constructed house, the buyer cannot sue on warranty; then to progress to Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,12 decided in the same state approximately a decade later, wherein the court replied to the traditional reasons for
caveat emptor in real estate transactions; then, with a quick backward glance
through Chandelorv. Lopus 13 and the bezar-stone, to move into the area of the
vendor of chattels with Henningsen14 and other landmark cases, both non-Code' 6
and Code; 16 and then to finish up with what must be the inevitable results of
this development in the "service" cases, 17 saving, however, the strong precaution
sounded by Magrine v. Krasnica'8 and Magrine v. Spector.'9 Considering that
11. 46 N.J. Super. 293, 134 A.2d 717 (App. Div. 1957), aff'd on other grounds, 26 N.J.
330, 139 A.2d 738 (1958).
12. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
13. 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (Cro. Jac. 4) (Ex. 1603).
14. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
15. E.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965);
Goldberg v. Koflsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d
592 (1963).
16. E.g., Neville Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970).
17. E.g., Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1960); Miller, A "Sale of Goods" As a Prerequisite for Warranty Protection, 24 Bus.
Law. 847 (1969).
18. 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967), affd sub nor. Magrine
v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d
129 (1969).
19. 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129
(1969).
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interwoven into these basic materials are sub-issues, such as disclaimers, limitations of liability and standards for warranty liability, and that the chapter includes a strong comparative section on the responsibilities of a vendor of contract
rights (intangibles, instruments and documents), Professor Peters' analysis establishes a frame of reference which makes it impossible to view the area in
precisely the same terms as before.
This conceptual thread continues, through Chapter 3, dealing with The Obligations of the Vendee for Payment;20 Chapter 4, concerning Third Party Interests
in Property: Good Faith Purchasers' and Creditors' Rights: The Need for Secured Transactions;2 ' Chapter 5, covering the Creation of a Valid and Effective
Secured Transaction;22 Chapter 6, examining Enforcing the Security Interest:
Against the Debtor;23 Chapter 7, discussing Special Problems of PriorRights
ity;24 and even into Chapter 8, which is solely textual, and constitutes A Negoti25
able Instruments Primer.
It seems possible to allege a different point of view for the book in yet another
respect. The chapter headings disclose what appears to be a subject matter
treatment of commercial law, in contrast to the transactional approach -0 which
20. See, e.g., Peters 595-99 wherein the author includes comparative materials on constructive conditions in contracts for the sale of goods and of land relating to obligations to
pay and to deliver or convey.
21. To illustrate, the author compares the rights of successive buyers of goods from the
same seller, the impact on those rights where the goods are covered by documents, and the
rights of successive assignees of contract rights. Id. at 735-810.
22. In one instance, there is material dealing with the rules with respect to afteracquired property in both chattel and realty contexts, including fixtures, and after-acquired
interests in contract claims and intangibles are also taken up. Id. at 1021-1115.
23. For example, the author explores the obvious parallels between the financing of goods
and the financing agency's responsibility for the seller's actions as evidenced by Norman v.
World Wide Distrib., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.d 115 (1963), and the financing of real
estate developments and the financing agency's responsibility for the seller's actions as
evidenced by Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 369 (1968). Not surprisingly, there are also materials allowing comparison of the
"foreclosure" process in both real estate security transactions and personal property security
transactions. Peters 1215-44.
24. This chapter is concerned not only with the priority positions of competing private
interests within article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, but also with the position of
private competitors outside of article 9 in the cases of services of goods and competing
interests in real property. Peters 1337-57.
25. Although this chapter is only a primer and entirely textual, it still contains useful
capsule camparisons between the commercial paper of Uniform Commercial Code article 3,
the item of article 4, the investment security of article 8, and the instrument of article 9.
Id. at 1411-51.
26. See E. Farnsworth & J. Honnold, Cases and Materials on Commercial Law :di(1963):
"9Because in our view a meaningful study of commercial law must take account of the way
in which businessmen conduct their affairs, both the emphasis and organization of this
casebook remain transactional." See also D. King, C. Kuenzel, T. Lauer, N. Littlefield &
B. Stone, Cases and Materials on Commercial Transactions under the Uniform Commercial
Code (1968); P. Speidel, R. Summers & J. White, Teaching Materials on Commercial
Transactions (1969).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 40

has appropriately arrived in this day when commercial law is increasingly taught
as an integrated course, rather than as fragmentary courses in Sales, Bills and
Notes, Security, and what have you. Of course, in part this is a reflection of the
organization of the book beyond transactions in goods, and ultimately judgment cannot be rendered on chapter titles alone. A transactional approach is
only as viable as the integration of its materials on sales, payment, and security
and, by the same token, a subject matter treatment is only that to the extent
that there is little or no integration of the parts. In view of this, Professor Peters'
book loses very little, if at all, since her blend of the materials leaves nothing of
the segmentation to which the transactional approach was a response.27
The book probably has not yet been written which does not have some deficiencies, at least in the eye of any particular reviewer; Professor Peters' book is
no exception to this observation. There are the usual petty matters, which are
not numerous and with respect to which I fell into the same error as the proofreader, such as the identification of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code as the
Uniform Consumers Credit Code in the Table of Statutory Citations, and the
misprint of "due cause holder" for "due course holder." 28 Other matters are not
so much misprints as misleading, such as categorizing as "wrongful alteration"
a case which need not unduly concern the due course holder because he still has
an enforceable instrument, 29 and such as statements which are precise enough
when made in one place, but which will probably nonetheless be misleading to
the average reader even though they are fleshed out in another place.80 Then
there are organizational matters upon which, admittedly, reasonable minds might
differ. For example, problems of equitable security interests are split, with the
27.

E.g., Peters 297-593, "The Responsibilities of the Vendor for Performance," delves

not only into warranty liability in sales of chattels, but also looks at transfers of contract
rights, such as where the original vendor sells his bundle of rights with respect to the buyer
(negotiable instrument/security interest or account)

to a financing agency. Furthermore,

documentary transactions are also examined. In short, the material looks at the problem in
the same breadth in which it is likely to arise in practice. Certainly this treatment lays fair
claim to being transactional in viewpoint.
28. Id. at 1432.
29. Id. Indeed, he does (U.C.C. § 3-407(3)), and it may even be completely enforceable
(U.C.C. § 3-406)). But more likely, it is only going to be enforceable according to Its
original tenor (U.C.C. § 3407(3)). Accordingly, the holder of a $50 check, which has

been raised to $5,000, is going to be concerned, even given that he is not without other

recourse (U.C.C. § 3-417(2)(c)).
30. For example, the author states: "Interestingly, the proposed Uniform Consumer

Credit Code is silent on the mechanics of repossession and liquidation, leaving Article 9
operative." Peters 1334. Right on, except that it leaves the impression that the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code does nothing in this area, which is simply inaccurate in view of
Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 5.103. Later on the same page but under a separate
heading, "The Consequences of Proper Liquidation," it is stated: "The proposed Uniform
Consumer Credit Code restricts deficiency judgments . . . !" Thus, there is no actual error,
but perhaps less than clear understanding might result. A similar situation obtains concerning the breadth of article 9 relating to transactions in contract rights, accounts and
chattel paper. Peters 808-09.
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Stephenson case 3' being cited on page 949, and Porterv. Searle3 2 being reprinted
on page 965, both of which are divorced from the related question of what

writing will satisfy section 9-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code or substitute

for its requirements.33 The "floating Hen" cases are also split 34 and, in turn, these
cases are in a separate and earlier heading from the topic of "Dominion: The
Duty to Police." This is a debatable organizational pattern if one believes that
the substance behind all the technical and theoretical litigation over the floating
lien in the bankruptcy courts is an attempt by bankruptcy officials to reintroduce
the "dominion rule" of Benedict v. Ratner,35 repealed by the Code,30 through
the back door of section 60,37 thereby replacing guards to unsecured creditors
that were lost when the Code abrogated that rule and allowed a "present" securto be taken in all that a commercial debtor owns or might own in the
ity interest
38
future
Unfortunately, there are also organizational choices to which this reviewer
must object. There is virtually nothing in the book concerning credit cards.
Given that it may be too early to predict that credit cards will, insofar as commercial significance goes, largely replace bills and notes, still the credit card has
31. Warren Tool Co. v. Stephenson, 11 Mich. App. 274, 161 N.W.2d 133 (1968).
32. 228 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1955).
33. Compare Peters 944-45 with U.C.C. § 9-203, Comment 5. Also, the effects of failing to obtain a writing pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-203 are split between the discussion at
Peters 944-45 and, for example, the case of First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Atlas Credit
Corp., 417 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1969), at Peters 1105, in which case I had the dubious
distinction of arguing the losing side, although in view of later commentaries and cases
I am persuaded that the decision was correct. Of course, Professor Peters is to be commended for her perception in including the case, for although we never were able to
ascertain exactly why the earlier security agreement was "missing," it probably was due to
the bank's practice of disposing of old papers, which arguably is not all that uncommon a
practice. More pertinently, it can be said that, organizationally, the material at Peters
944-45 purports to deal only with the question of whether there must be a written agreement explicitly indicative of an intent on the part of the debtor to create a security
interest; Stephenson is cited as part of a larger discussion of the place of equitable liens
with respect to the Code. Id. at 948-49; Porter v. Searle appears among a number of cases
dealing with the powers of the trustee in bankruptcy. Id. at 965. Since Atlas can correctly be
read as concerning a missing security agreement rather than a failure to obtain one, it can
be viewed as turning upon the question of priority.
34. Grain Merchants of Ind., Inc. v. Union Bank & Say. Co, 408 F2d 209 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 US. 827 (1969), reprinted at Peters 1093; Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262
F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967), reprinted at Peters 1042. From another perspective though,
Rudnick does appear in materials concerned with goods, and Grain Merchants in materials
concerned with intangibles.
35. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
36. U.C.C. § 9-205.
37. Bankruptcy Act § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970).
38. See 1 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 8.3 (1965). See also
In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 194 (D. Ore. 1966),
rev'd in part, 271 F. Supp. 395 (D. Ore. 1967), aff'd sub. nom. Dubay v. Williams, 417 F.2d
1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
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acquired too much momentum to be ignored in a primary course in commercial
transactions.8 9 The fact that the Code omits this development" is no reason for
commercial law teachers to do so. Another objection is that there is precious
little reference to the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, already enacted in six
states, 41 which has had a substantial impact on the situation which obtains
under the Uniform Commercial Code, 42 and about which it seems reasonable to
predict that it may enjoy an adoption equal to the Uniform Commercial Code
in an even shorter period of time. 43 Even in more traditional matters, there is
an overly sparse treatment of a number of major issues, such as the satisfaction
of the requirements of good faith and lack of notice for holding in due course, 44
39. See, e.g., E. Farnsworth & J. Honnold, Cases and Materials on Commercial Law 410-38
(1968). Note that in the few years since 1968, even this material has become dated, not
only statistically, but also from the standpoint of developments, such as the federal law
prohibiting the issuance of credit cards without solicitation, limiting cardholder liability
for unauthorized uses of credit cards, and imposing penalties for fraudulent uses of credit
cards to obtain goods or services. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1642-44 (1971).
40. For a delightful discussion suggesting the rationale for this omission in terms of
general principles see Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. Colo, L. Rev. 461 (1967).
41. See note 5 supra.
42. For example, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code imposes heretofore largely unknown restrictions on the ability of a creditor to take a security interest in the property
of a debtor. See Uniform Consumer Credit Code §§ 2.407-.409, 3.510. Compare Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), with U.C.C. § 9-204(4) (b).
There is no reference to any of this in connection with the material on after-acquired property
or in proximity to the reprint of the Williams case. Peters 1299-1304. The some 10 references
to the Uniform Consumer Credit Code are listed in the Table of Statutory Citations, Id. at
Ivi. Perhaps most puzzling of all are the twenty-nine pages (id. at 1249-78) devoted to
Massachusetts consumer credit legislation rather than the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
See id. at 1282 for a reply.
43. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code is order out of chaos. Its time has come in
much the same way as had article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code which represented
a way out of an intolerable state of affairs a few years back. See Gilmore, On Statutory
Obsolescence, 39 U. Colo. L. Rev. 461, 474 (1967).
44. See, e.g., Peters, 893, 1244-49, & 1433-37. True, there are also cases discussing
these considerations in the consumer context, e.g., Norman v. World Wide Distrib., Inc.,
202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963), reprinted at Peters 1215, and Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp. v. Ingel, 347 Mass. 119, 196 N.E.2d 847 (1964), reprinted at Peters 1218, but
can the student, from these cases and the text, gain an adequate understanding of why
many now agree that the subjective test has failed and why it makes a difference whether
or not it has failed (see, e.g., Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The
Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 S. Cal. L. Rev. 48 (1966)) without which understanding
the new era of growing restraints on negotiability must in some part remain enigmatic. Perhaps a reply is that the battle is over. However, it appears to be an odd departure from
Professor Peters' normal style to look only at the results without also inquiring in some
depth why the battle was fought. Moreover, it is submitted that an adequate understanding
here is a prerequisite to validly resolving the next battle which has already begun. See, e.g.,
Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New UCCC, 44
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 272 (1969); Miller, An Alternative Response to the Supposed Direct Loan
Loophole in the UCCC, 24 Okla. L. Rev. 427 (1971).

1972]

BOOKS REVIEWED

and the potential conflicts between inventory and accounts lenders. 5 Of course,
it is true that there are a finite number of hours which can be devoted to a principal commercial law course in any curriculum, and given the author's broader
approach to the basic subject, something else must receive less or little emphasis.
Perhaps, then, the fundamental question is whether we can afford to give shorter
shrift to major issues in and developments from the traditional sphere of commercial law, in favor
of a broader perspective with respect to some of the other
46
basic problems?
Ultimately, the utilization of Professor Peters' book will depend on the consensus on this question. Worth, however, is another matter. Suffice it to say, the
book ably reflects a different point of view, and is therefore a valuable addition
to the teaching materials and resources for commercial law. It provides, and
highlights, an option where, in large part, there was no option before. I recommend the book, if not for adoption, then simply because one cannot read it without coming away with a better understanding of commercial law.
FR.DEIicK H. M=ER*

Crimes, Courts and

Figures: An Introduction

to Criminal Statistics.

By Nigel Walker. Baltimore: Penguin Books. 1971. Pp. 160. $2.95.
In the editorial foreword to this slim volume the general purpose of Walker's
work is given as "an introduction [for the lawyer] to ways of thinking which
allow him to assess more readily the effects of the criminal law in society and the
reliability of his own views about its efficacy." 1 More specifically, the author in
his preface states that he has attempted to remedy two omissions of "social
45. Professor Peters commits one third of a page in a text-question treatment to this. Peters
1354. Compare, e.g, Kripke, Suggestions for Clarifying Article 9: Intangibles, Proceeds, and
Priorities, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 687 (1966). It might be argued that there has not been real

litigation over this; it might also be said that without an adequate understanding of the
problem, extensive litigation is likely to ensure, especially since the legal cure is probably
some years away. See Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Preliminary Draft No. 2: Proposals for Changes in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
and Related Changes in Other Articles with Reasons Therefore, 2S Bus. Law. 1067, 1093-94
(1970).

46. Essentially, Professor Peters' book recovers considerable ground presumably once
covered in courses in Contracts and Remedies. To integrate these materials with the traditional commercial law materials provides a continuum, which cannot but result in a better
perspective. Moreover, it will go a long way toward curing the reported complaint of

Grant Gilmore, which was made with reference to a single course rather than several
courses: In law school "[alt best, we give our students a series of unrelated flashes of
brilliance; at worst, nothing." Noted in R. Speidel, R. Summers & J. White, Teaching

Materials on Commercial Transactions xii (1969). Nonetheless, I personally find more fun
and profit on the other end of the spectrum.
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma School of Law.
1. N. Walker, Crimes, Courts and Figures 7 (1971)

[hereinafter cited as Walker].
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statisticians." First, "a neglect of ... the 'grass-roots' of their subject, [i.e.,] the
situations in which events involving human beings are converted into numbers
by other fallible human beings;" 2 and second, that most users of social statistics need "to answer fairly simple questions by the simplest means; but the
textbooks are intent on the sophisticated techniques which are needed by re'3
search workers."
Unfortunately, this book is of very limited value to the American reader since
the "Crimes, Courts and Figures" discussed are for England and Wales. Essentially a primer on criminal statistics for the British lawyer, the book does cover
several areas of interest to the non-British reader concerned about the vagaries
of crime statistics. Such areas as unreported and recorded offenses, "cleared-up"
offenses, judicial statistics, measurement of trends, indexing crimes, measurement
of deterrent and correctional efficacy of penal sanctions, and prediction techniques are particularly catholic in their relevance for the American reader, especially so for those desiring to compare British and American policies and procedures. Fortunately, Walker provides a glossary of terms,4 albeit containing only
56 items, which reduces some of the terminological confusion bound to confront
the reader unfamiliar with the British system of criminal justice.
If a lawyer attempts to use this book for the purpose described in the editorial
preface he will be disappointed. The author's chapter divisions, while covering
most of the crucial areas of crime statistics, fail to provide for a meaningful integration of the material. Thus, the cumulative effects of criminal justice decisionmaking data in these various areas are left solely to the reader's skill in pulling
together the separate threads.
This book does provide valuable information necessary for the "lay" reader
to adequately interpret British criminal justice data. Three of the most important issues are crime clearance rates, "deterrent efficacy," and the mis-classification and prediction of complex issues.
Frequently, data on offenses cleared by some component of the criminal justice
system is used to judge the efficiency of that component. Walker devotes one
chapter to the topic of offenses cleared-up by the police. He points to the difficulty in relating the arrest of a person charged with a specific crime or crimes
to later decisions within the system, i.e., prosecution and conviction. According
to Walker, the British court has "cleared-up" offenses even in those crimes where
prosecution is dropped or, significantly, where the result is an acquittal. 0 Walker
states that should a jury find reasonable doubt that the right person was tried,
this "does not mean [that] 'probably it was someone else' . . . [since] the police
are often in the position of having better evidence that it was the right person
than they are able to bring into court." 7 However one might quarrel with such
a position, one must admire its frankness. By comparison, national clearance
2. Id. at 9.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 137-41.
5. Id. at 29-35.
6. Id. at 30.
7. Id. at 31.
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rates in the United States are based upon a simpler instruction: "[P ] ol i ce clear
a crime when they have identified the offender, have sufficient evidence to charge
him and actually take him into custody." s
The author does an excellent job of putting into proper perspective the question, "Does criminal justice work?" in his chapters on deterrent and corrective
efficacy. 9 He leads off his treatment of this area by cautioning those who would
attempt to judge the worth of criminal justice first to understand clearly the
objectives of sanctions and other measures provided by the criminal law. Among
these objectives are retribution, compensation, correction and the prevention of
future criminality. Obviously, methods of measuring how well such objectives
are being reached must be varied and, as Walker stresses, some objectives cannot
be measured at all (as the case of retribution: "[T]here is no scientific means,
and probably no human means, of telling whether the sentence in question is
appropriate, excessive or lenient.")' 0 Undoubtedly, the goals of criminal justice
are so varied and possibly contradictory (witness the use of incarceration as both
punishment and correction) and society's expectations so unclear that any effort
at evaluation of the system's efficacy may well be doomed to inconclusive results
at best."
Often overlooked by those studying crime statistics with a view toward evaluating the criminal justice system or some component thereof is the problem of
"mis-classification" of offenders. Walker deals with this problem, essentially one
of improper selection of offenders for certain sanctions or correctional measures,
by using hypothetical and empirical data. His presentation is clear and to the
point. It is important to note, however, that studies have not only shown that
mis-classification occurs and has a strong effect on deterrent and correctional
results but, more optimistically, have occasionally provided solid evidence that
it is possible to identify with considerable 2accuracy those offenders who would
best respond to particular penal measures.'
Finally, Walker provides a most meaningful discussion of prediction. He carefully lays out the ethical and legal pitfalls involved in predicting the future outcome of the imposition of particular penal measures (e.g., predicting which prison
inmates will be the best parole risks). Of considerable importance in this regard
is the tendency of such predictions to result in the operation of self-fulfilling
prophesies; if the level of error is high, as is frequently the case, serious unfortunate consequences are brought about for the offender and the criminal justice
system. For example, inaccurately predicting that a juvenile will become a dechild might
linquent and subsequently dealing with him as a "pre-delinquent"
13
well result in producing the delinquency one seeks to prevent.
8.
9.
10.
11.
rence
12.
gang,
13.

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 30 (1971).
Walker 90-122.
Id. at 90.
For an examination of this problem of goal conflict see Morris & Zimring, "feterand Corrections," 381 Annals 137 (Jan. 1969).
M. Adams, "The PICO Project," reported in N. Johnston, L. Savitz & M. WolfThe Socidology of Punishment and Correction 548 (2d ed. 1970).
For a discussion of prediction of future delinquency see Craig & Glick, Ten Years'
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For the reader interested in a serious examination of criminal justice statistics
in the United States this book can only be useful as a way of identifying basic
issues. He needs to look at several more relevant source materials. An absolute
minimum would be the Uniform Crime Reports 14 and the work done under the
auspices of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice. 15 In addition, he would do well to consider some basic general texts
dealing with the presentation and interpretation of statistical data. 10 Notwithstanding this word of caution, Mr. Walker's book can provide the reader with
valuable insights into criminal statistics and the premises which they suggest.
THo .s F. COURTLESS*
Experience with the Glueck Social Prediction Table, 9 Crime & Delinquency 249 (1963);
Kahn, The Case of the Premature Claims, 11 Crime & Delinquency 217 (1965).
14. The most complete crime statistics are based on the Uniform Crime Reports compiled by local law enforcement agencies and disseminated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation each year. The most recent compilation is for 1970 and is reported in Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States (1971).
15. The President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task
Force Report: Crime and Its Impact-An Assessment (1967).
16. An excellent reference for the non-statistician is H. Zeisel, Say It with Figures (Sth
ed. 1968).
* Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University School of Law.

